In a single server environment, one server is responsible for providing services to all the authorized remote users. However, the problem arises if a user wishes to access several network services. To overcome this weakness, various multi-server authentication schemes have been proposed. In 2012, Taygi et al.
INTRODUCTION
In the client/server environment password-based authentication scheme with smart card is widely used in remote user authentication. Li et al. [2] first proposed authentication scheme for multi-server architecture based on neural networks. They had shown that their scheme allows users to choose the password freely. Lin et al. [3] found that Li et al.'s scheme takes long time on training neural networks and they proposed an improved scheme using ElGamal digital signature [4] and geometric properties on the Euclidean plane. Cao and Zhong [5] proved that there is impersonation attack and every users have to store large amount of public parameters in memory of smart card for authentication in Lin et al.'s scheme. Juang [6] proposed a scheme based on nonce, one-way hash function and symmetric cryptosystem, which is efficient with an additional trait of generating session key. Neverless, Ku et al. [7] proved that Juang's scheme is exposed to insider attack and fails to provide forward secrecy. Chang and Lee [8] proposed an improvement scheme over Juang's scheme and claimed that their scheme is able to resist stolen-verified attack, server spoofing attack, smart card loss attack, reply attack and provides mutual authentication and forward secrecy. Liao and Wang [9] proposed a dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme based on one way hash function. But Chen et al. [10] pointed out that Liao-Wang's scheme does not provide forward secrecy. Hsiang and Shih [11] found that Liao-Wang's scheme is insecure against insider attack, impersonation attack, server spoofing attack and shows inadequacy in providing mutual authentication. To remove these drawbacks, they also proposed an improved scheme. Though, Sood et al. [12] pointed out that Hsiang-Shih's improved scheme is insecured against reply attack, impersonation attack, stolen smart card attack. Tsai [13] suggested a nonce based scheme based on one way hash function. However, Zhu [14] proved that Tsai's scheme is vulnerable to denning-sacco [15] attack, server spoofing attack and does not provide perfect forward secrecy. To overcome these drawbacks, they proposed an improved scheme.
In 2012, Taygi et al. [1] proposed a scheme based on nonce and one way hash function. In this paper, it is demonstrated that this scheme is insecure against user impersonation attack, server masquerading attack, collaboration attack between a valid user and a server, smart card stolen attack, password guessing attack and password change attack. To overcome these weakness we propose the improvement of their scheme. In addition, proposed scheme also provides better computational cost as well as communication cost than the related scheme published earlier.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the Taygi et al.'s [1] scheme. Section 3 shows the brief description of attacks on Taygi et al.'s [1] scheme. Section 4 describes the proposed scheme which withstand the weaknesses of Taygi et al.'s [1] scheme. Section 5 describes cryptanalysis of proposed improved scheme and section 6 compares the performances of proposed scheme with previously published scheme. Conclusion of this paper appears in section 7. Finally References are given in section 8.
BRIEF REVIEW OF TAYGI ET AL.'S SCHEME
This section presents briefly description of Taygi et al.'s [1] remote user authentication scheme in multi server environment using smart card. The notations used throughout this paper are summarized as follows:
Their scheme consists of following four phases: Registration phase, Login phase, Authentication phase and Password Change phase.
Registration Phase
This phase is divided into two sub-phases: Server Registration phase and User Registration phase.
Server Registration Phase
In this phase, S j selects SID j and submits it to RC over a secure channel. After receiving it, RC computes the server secret parameter SS j = (g h(SID j , h(x)) mod p) ⊕ h(d) and sends {SS j , h(d)} to S j over a secure channel.
−→ cryptographic one way hash function ⊕ −→ bitwise XOR operation SKey ij −→ session key shared between U i and S j N 1 −→ random nonce generated by
−→ random nonce generated by S j n i −→ random nonce generated by RC for each user w j −→ random nonce generated by RC for each server
User Registration Phase
U i selects ID i and P W i , computes h(P W i ) and submits {ID i , h(P W i )} to RC over a secure channel. After receiving registration request, RC computes
and issues a smart card for U i by storing {x i , y i , z i , p, g, h(·)} for (i = 1 to n) into memory of smart card.
Login Phase
U i inserts his/her smart card to the card reader and then supply ID i and P W i . The smart card computes z i = y i ⊕ h(P W i ) and checks whether computed z i equals stored z i or not. If equal, smart card generates a random nonce
and sends the login request message {ID i , SID j , d i , e i , N 1 } to S j .
Authentication phase
After receiving the login request message
checks whether X 2 and X 2 are equal. If equality holds, S j is authentic, otherwise terminate the session. Subsequently, U i computes X 3 = Q j N 1 ×N 2 mod p and sends {ID i , X 3 } to S j .
Once the message {ID i , X 3 } is received, S j computes X 3 = Q j N 1 ×N 2 mod p and checks whether X 3 and X 3 are equal. If equality holds, mutual authentication is achieved. Both the parties agree upon a common shared session key SKey ij = h(ID i , SID j , Q j , N 1 , N 2 ).
Password Change phase
If user U i wants to change his/her password, U i inserts the smart card to the card reader and submits ID i and P W i . The reader computes z i = y i ⊕ h(P W i ) and checks whether computed z i equals stored z i . If equal, U i enters a new password P W ), 
User Impersonation Attack
If an attacker can obtain the secret values (x i , y i , z i ) from the user's smart card illegally by some means and intercept the message {ID i , SID j , d i , e i , N 1 } in the login phase, the attacker can perform the user impersonation attack as the following steps:
Step 1: Attacker computes which is equal to h(
Step 2: The attacker generates a random nonce N * and compute
Step 3: After receiving the forged message msg, S j checks the validity of ID i and compute
It can be shown that both are equal then authenticated server will be convinced the message sent from the legal user.
Step 4: After choosing a random nonce N 2 , authenticated server S j makes the reply message
Server Masquerading Attack
After obtaining the secret values (x i , y i , z i ) from the user's smart card, further the attacker intercept the message {ID i , SID j , d i , e i , N 1 } and (X 1 , X 2 ) in the login phase and authentication phase respectively, then the attacker can perform the Server masquerading attack as the following steps:
Step 1: The attacker computes Q j = g h(SID j , (x i ⊕d i )) mod p ). Then it chooses a random number r and again compute X 1 = y i ⊕ N 1 ⊕ r, X 2 = Q j r mod p and sends {ID i , X 1 , X 2 } to the user U i .
Step 2: After receiving the forged message, user U i compute r = y i ⊕ X 1 ⊕ N 1 , X 2 = Q j r mod p and verifies whether X 2 = X 2 .
It can be easily verified that X 2 = X 2 .
Step 3: Then user U i makes the reply message {ID i , X 3 } by computing X 3 = Q j N 1 ×r mod p.
Collaboration Attack between a Valid User and a Server
In
p and x i is stored in smart card of user U i . Now let valid user U i provides this computed h(x) to an another authenticated server S m . Then S m can easily compute the secret key of another authenticated server S j , by computing
where SID j is known from login message and h(d) is known to all authenticated servers. Suppose another valid user U k is trying to communicate securely to authenticated server S j . After sending a valid login message to S j , another authenticated server S m can verify the user U k because S m can compute the secret key of S j . If the server S m sends forge message {ID k , X 1m , X 2m } earlier than S j to the user U k by computing
where N 3 is randomly chosen by S m . Then following scenario can be happened.
Step 1: User U k will accept the forge message which is send by S m .
Step 2: At that time if another valid verification message
where N 2 is randomly chosen by S j . The card reader will confuse which one will be accepted.
Step 3: If card reader choose forge message of S m and send
reject the valid user U k because X 3 = Q j N 1 ×N 3 mod p and
Password Guessing Attack
After extracting the secret values (x i , y i , z i ) from a legal user's smart card by some means, the attacker can easily find out P W i using following steps:
Step 1: An attacker computes h(P W * i ) and checks the correctness whether h(P W * i ) = z i ⊕ y i .
Step 2: An attacker repeats the above process until the correct password is obtained. After some guessing, an attacker can find out the correct password.
Smart Card Stolen Attack
Suppose a user U i either lost or stolen by an attacker of his/her smart card. After getting the smart card, the attacker can extract the secret information {x i , y i , z i , p, g, h(.)} from the user's smart card. We also assume that attacker store the i − th login message of the user U i . As a result attacker can store the value {ID i , SID j , d i , e i , N 1 }. By using these secret information and stored parameter, attacker can create valid login message, described in user impersonation and server masquerading attack procedure in section 3.
Password Change Attack
After obtaining secret values (x i , y i , z i ) from the legal user's smart card, an attacker can easily find out P W i by performing the password guessing technique as describe in attack subsection 3.4. After getting correct P W i , the attacker can change the valid user's password from the password change phase. So card reader will always reject the valid user in login phase.
PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we will propose the improvement of Taygi et al.'s [1] remote user authentication scheme in multi-server environment using smart card to overcome their weaknesses. It is assumed that Registration Center (RC) is a trusted authority.
We now describe the registration procedure of proposed scheme is as follows:
Registration Phase
Server Registration Phase
In this phase, S j selects SID j and submits it to RC over a secure channel. After receiving the registration request from S j , RC generate a random nonce w j for each server (j =
} into memory of user's smart card. After getting smart card, user U i store k into memory of smart card.
Login Phase
U i inserts the smart card into the card reader and submit ID i and P W i . The card reader computes B *
and checks whether computed G * i equals stored G i . If true, card reader generates a random nonce N 1 and computes C 1 = B * i
In the following we prove the correctness of G * i = G i :
Authentication Phase
and checks whether E * i equals E i . If equals then proceed to mutual authentication Phase else reject user U i . Further S j generates a random nonce N 2 and computes
SKey * ij ) and checks A * 2 equals A 2 . If equals then mutual authentication is achieved and both the parties agree with a common shared session key SKey ij for securing future data communications.
In the following we prove the correctness of
Password Change Phase
This phase is invoked when U i wants to change the password. U i inserts the smart card into the card reader and submits ID i and P W i . Then card reader computes B * 
instead of K i , D i and G i respectively in the memory of smart card. Thus U i can change the password without taking any assistance from S j .
CRYPTANALYSIS OF PROPOSED SCHEME
This section describes cryptanalysis of proposed scheme. In this paper, to analyze the security analysis of proposed scheme, it can be assumed that an attacker could obtain the secret values stored in the smart card by monitoring the power consumption [16] [17] and intercept messages communicating between the user and the server. Also it can be assumed that an attacker may possess the capabilities to thwart the security scheme.
User Impersonation Attack
To impersonate as a legitimate user, an attacker attempts to make a forged login request message which can be authenticated to a server. However, the attacker can not impersonate as the legitimate user by forging the login request message even if the attacker can extract the secret values {K i , Y i , G i , D i , X, k} stored in the user's smart card, because the attacker can not compute the valid login request message {E i , C 1 , C 3 } without knowing the secret password P W i of valid user U i . In proposed scheme if the attacker wants to get the secret parameter P W i , he/she must have to solve the inversion of cryptographic hash function which is computationally hard. So proposed scheme is secured against user impersonation attack.
Server Masquerading Attack
To masquerade as a legitimate server, an attacker attempts to make the forged reply message which can be masqueraded to the user when receiving the users login request message. However, the attacker can not masquerade as the server by forging the reply message, because it is hard to compute {A 1 , A 2 } by an attacker without knowing the secret value h(d) and h(x w j ) kept by the server. Hence the attacker can not masquerade as the legitimate server to the user by launching the server masquerading attack.
Collaboration Attack between a Valid User and a Server
In proposed scheme to perform collaboration attack between a valid user and a server, another authenticated server S m needs to compute the secret key of S j . To compute the secret key of S j , S m needs to compute h(x w j ) from the communicating message between the user U i and the server S j . But the communicating message between the user and server are independent of h(x w j ). Hence it is hard to compute the secret key SS j of the server S j by another server S m . So proposed scheme is secured against the collaboration attack between a valid user and a server.
Password Guessing Attack
After getting secret values {K i , Y i , G i , D i , X, k} stored in the user U i smart card, the attacker attempts to derive the user
and D i in the user registration phase. To guess the user's password, attacker needs to compute B i from K i , G i and D i but it is not possible. So proposed scheme is secured against password guessing attack.
Smart Card Stolen Attack
It can be assumed that the user U i has either lost his/her smart card or stolen by an attacker. After getting the smart card, an attacker can extract the secret information {K i , Y i , G i , D i , X, k} from the smart card. Also can be assumed that attacker stores the i − th login message {SID j , Y i , C 1 , E i , C 3 } of the user U i . After getting all these parameter that is login message and smart card parameter, it is hard to derive P W i , server secret information h(d) and h(x w j ) by the attacker. So attacker can not create the valid login message. As a result proposed scheme is secured against smart card stolen attack.
Insider Attack
Generally, many user uses same password for their convenience of remembering and easy of use whenever required. However if the system manager or privileged insider of the server knows user's password, he/she may try to access user's U i other accounts in other server. But in proposed scheme, the system manager or privileged insider of the server can not derive user's password P W i because user have submitted h(B i ) = g P W i ×k mod p instead of P W i . To get correct P W i , system manager must have to solve Diffie-Hellman problem [18] which is computationally hard. So proposed scheme resists insider attack.
Password Change Attack
As described in attack 5.4 and attack 5.5 in section 5, proposed scheme can withstand the Password guessing attack and smart card stolen attack. To perform password change attack, an attacker have to provide correct ID i and P W i to the card reader. But in proposed scheme, there is no way to get correct P W i to the attacker. So proposed scheme is secured against password change attack.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section we evaluated the performance of proposed scheme with Taygi Also the storage cost (stored into the memory of smart card) takes almost same bits of proposed scheme and their scheme that is 3840 bits, 3456 bits respectively. Table 3 shows that their scheme is insecure against different possible attacks. Further proposed scheme provides strong authentication against different attacks described in section 5. After resisting all possible attacks of related scheme, proposed scheme provides low computational and low communication cost than their scheme. Hence proposed scheme is more efficient and secure than Taygi et al.'s [1] scheme. A valid user can change the password freely and securely without taking any help from the servers or registration center. As the card reader first verifies the old password in the password change phase, so unauthorized users cannot change the authorized users password even if they get the valid user's smart card.
(5) Early Wrong Password Detection
If the user U i inputs a wrong password by mistake in password change phase, it will be quickly detected by the card reader itself since card reader computes B * i = g P W i ×k mod p, IDU *
R 1 R 2 ) and checks whether G * i equals G i . Hence proposed scheme provides early wrong password detection. In proposed scheme, each server has unique secret parameter SS j = h(SID j , h(x d)) ⊕ h(x w j ) used to authenticate the user. Hence there is no need to store the secret parameter of all the servers in the memory of smart card. The proposed scheme uses randomly generated nonce N 1 and N 2 instead of time stamps to avoid time synchronization problem.
CONCLUSION
This paper shows that Taygi et al.'s [1] scheme suffers from different attacks. To over come these weaknesses a proposed scheme is given in this paper. Further, the proposed scheme is more efficient in terms of computational and communication cost than that of Taygi et al.'s [1] scheme. In addition, proposed scheme provides mutual authentication between user and authentication server and also user can change his/her password freely without help of registration server.
It is shown that the proposed scheme provides strong security protocol based on the user's password. For the better security, biometric feature as well as password can be incorporate in the protocol.
